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NOTES 
FEDERAL COURTS-DISCOVERY-Stay of Discovery in 
Civil Court To Protect Proceedings in Concurrent 
Criminal Action-The Pattern of Remedies 
The federal criminal discovery rules were a carefully weighed 
compromise between the parties' needs for information and the 
defendant's need for protection from inquisatorial investigation.1 
This balance may be upset when the more liberal discovery rules 
in a concurrent, related civil action permit information to be ob-
tained which is not discoverable under the criminal rules.2 Two 
recent cases, United States v. Simon3 and United States v. American 
Radiator &- Standard Sanitary Corp.,4 illustrate the difficulty of pro-
tecting the integrity of the criminal discovery rules in such a 
situation. 
The Simon decision arose as part of a criminal action in the 
United States Court for the Southern District of New York in which 
the defendants were charged with mail fraud and conspiracy to com-
mit mail fraud5 and to file a misleading corporate balance sheet 
report with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 6 Prior to their 
indictment, certain of the defendants to the criminal charges were 
named as defendants in a civil action in the United States Court 
for the Eastern District of New York brought by the trustee in re-
organization of the corporation involved. The civil complaint al-
leged a conspiracy among some of the defendants to despoil the 
corporation of its assets and to conceal the despoliation by means 
of false reports and negligence on the part of other defendants in 
permitting the despoliation. After the deposition of one of the de-
fendants in the civil action had been taken and discovery of a second 
defendant had begun, the criminal indictment, naming these two 
civil defendants among others, was filed. The defendants in the 
criminal action immediately requested the civil court to stay the 
taking of their depositions until the conclusion of the criminal trial. 
The application for the stay was rejected, and the Court of Appeals 
1. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 
56, 87 (1961). See also Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage 
in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1172-99 (1960). 
2. See generally Note, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 67 CoLUM, L. 
REv. 1277 (1967); see notes 13-23 supra and accompanying text for a comparison of 
the civil and criminal rules of procedure. 
3. 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967), reversing 262 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cert. 
granted sub nom. Simon v. Wharton, 386 U.S. 1030 (1967), remanded with instructions 
to dismiss as moot, 36 U.S.L.W. 3252 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1967). 
4. 272 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. Pa.), reversed, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) 
tJ 72,311 (3d Cir. 1967). 
5. 18 u.s.c. § 1341 (1964). 
6. 15 u.s.c. § 78ff (1964), 18 u.s.c. § 1001 (1964). 
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for the Second Circuit dismissed an appeal on the ground that the 
district court's decision was not a final judgment and thus was not 
a proper basis for an appeal.7 The criminal defendants then asked 
the criminal court for an injunction to restrain the trustee from 
taking their depositions in the civil action until the conclusion of 
the criminal trial, arguing that a failure to grant the injunction 
would deprive them of a fair criminal trial. The injunction was 
granted by the criminal court8 only to be reversed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit.9 
In American Radiator, the government brought a criminal action 
in the United States Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
charging that several corporations and certain corporate officers had 
conspired to fix prices in violation of section I of the Sherman Act. 
During the pretrial stages of this criminal action, two civil class 
actions, seeking treble damages for defendants' alleged price-fixing, 
were filed against the corporate criminal defendants in the United 
States Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The corporate 
defendants applied to the civil court for a stay of all civil proceed-
ings until the termination of criminal proceedings, but the appli-
cation was denied.10 The corporate and individual criminal defen-
dants then requested the criminal court to enjoin the civil plaintiffs 
from using civil discovery procedures to require them to answer 
questions and produce documents and to enjoin the criminal defen-
dants from responding to pleadings, interrogatories, or motions to 
produce documents in the civil case. The criminal court, while 
acknowledging the civil plaintiffs' right to prompt discovery, granted 
the injunction on the ground that the civil discovery might disclose 
information which would not be available through criminal dis-
covery.11 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit later reversed 
this decision.12 
As the principal cases indicate, protections guaranteed to crim-
inal defendants thro.ugh the criminal discovery rules may be of little 
value if the prosecution can obtain the information it seeks by dis-
covery in a concurrent civil proceeding. The Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, which provide very limited discovery possibilities,13 
prevent the prosecution from taking depositions or interrogatories 
from the defendant. Depositions of witnesses may be taken only by 
the defendant and then solely for the purposes of preserving testi-
7. See 262 F. Supp. 64, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (1964). 
8. 262 F. Supp. at 64. 
9. 373 F.2d at 649. 
IO. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary 
Corp., 269 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Pa. 1967), writ of mandamus denied, (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 
1968) (unreported), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3334 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1968) (No. 1069). 
11. 272 F. Supp. at 691. 
12. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) at ,I 72,311. 
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15-17 (1966). 
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many or obtaining statements of witnesses who would not be able 
to attend the trial.14 Documents within the defendant's possession 
which he intends to produce at trial and which are material to the 
preparation of the government's case may be obtained by the prose-
cution under rule 16(c),15 but only if the defendant has first requested 
discovery of the prosecution under rule 16(a) or (b).16 
On the other hand, civil discovery in the federal courts operates 
with relatively few restrictions.17 Depositions and interrogatories 
14. Id. 15: 
Rule 15. Depositions 
(a) When Taken. If it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to 
attend or prevented from attending a trial or hearing, that his testimony is 
material and that it is necessary to take his deposition in order to prevent a 
failure of justice, the court at any time after the filing of an indictment or infor-
mation may upon motion of a defendant and notice to the parties order that his 
testimony be taken by deposition and that any designated books, papers, docu-
ments or tangible objects, not privileged, be produced at the same time and place. 
If a witness is committed for failure to give bail to appear to testify at a trial or 
hearing, the court on written motion of the witness and upon notice to the 
parties may direct that his deposition be taken. After the deposition has been 
subscribed the court may discharge the witness. 
15. Id. 16(c): 
(c) Discovery by the Government. If the court grants relief sought by the 
defendant under subdivision (a) (2) or subdivision (b) of this rule, it may, upon 
motion of the government, condition its order by requiring that the defendant 
permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph scientific or medical 
reports, books, papers, documents, tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, 
which the defendant intends to produce at the trial and which are within his 
possession, custody or control, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation 
of the government's case and that the request is reasonable. Except as to scien-
tific or medical reports, this subdivision does not authorize the discovery or in-
spection of reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the 
defendant, or his attorneys or agents in connection with the investigation or de-
fense of the case, or of statements made by the defendant, or by government or 
defense witnesses, or by prospective government or defense witnesses, to the 
defendant, his agents or attorneys. 
16. Id. 16(a) &: (b): 
Rule 16. Discovery and Inspection 
(a) Defendant's Statements; Reports of Examinations and Tests; Defendant's 
Grand Jury Testimony. Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the 
attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or 
photograph any relevant (1) written or recorded statements or confessions made 
by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of 
the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due dili-
gence may become known, to the attorney for the government, (2) results or reports 
of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in 
connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession, cus-
tody or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the 
exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government, 
and (3) recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury. 
(b) Other Books, Papers, Documents, Tangible Objects or Places. Upon motion 
of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the government to permit 
the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, tan-
gible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within 
the possession, custody or control of the government, upon a showing of material-
ity to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. Except 
as provided in subdivision (a) (2), this rule does not authorize the discovery or 
inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made 
by government agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the 
case, or of statements made by goverment witnesses or prospective government 
witnesses (other than the defendant) to agents of the government except as pro-
vided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500. 
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 (1967). 
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may be served upon any person, including a party to the action, and 
may inquire into any matter which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action and which is neither privileged18 
nor protected by the work-product limitation.19 Documents and re-
ports are discoverable merely upon a showing of good cause.20 
Thus, when concurrent civil and criminal actions involve com-
mon factual elements, civil discovery may reveal the strategy of the 
defendant's case and the broad outlines his defense will take, includ-
ing an insight into what evidence may be used and which witnesses 
may be subpoenaed.21 When the government is a party to the civil 
action, the prosecution can obtain vital information directly from 
the criminal defendants or from persons closely related to the crim-
inal action22 by deposing them as parties or witnesses in the civil 
action, even though such information is not discoverable under the 
criminal rules. Even when the government is not actually a party 
in the civil action, the civil plaintiff's discovery of the defendants 
may be of practical benefit to the prosecution. There is, for instance, 
the possibility of collusion between the civil plaintiff and the gov-
ernment, and, even without actual collusion, it is realistic to recog-
nize that it is difficult to restrict the fruits of civil discovery to the 
private party.23 The indirect benefit to the government when it is 
not a party in the civil ·action is particularly prejudicial since the 
criminal defendant is denied civil discovery of the prosecution, and 
thus the reciprocity principle upon which the criminal discovery 
rules are predicated is undermined.24 
18. Id. 26(b). 
19. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1967). 
21. It should be noted that civil discovery may not tum up all of the defenses 
that the defendant plans to use at the criminal trial. The defense of insanity, which 
would probably have no relation to the civil trial, is one example. 
22. Possible examples are instances in which the criminal defendants are corporate 
officers and the civil deposition of their corporation is attempted or where the crim-
inal defendant is a member of a partnership and the civil deposition of another 
partner is sought. 
23. See United States v. Simon, 262 F. Supp. 64, 72-73, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Such an 
advantage is unwarranted, especially in light of the fact that the prosecution is thought 
to have far greater out-of-court discovery possibilities than criminal defendants. See 
Goldstein, supra note I; Louisell, supra note I, at 87. 
24. See text of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c) quoted in note 15 supra. This could be reme-
died by allowing defendants to seek information from the government for use in the 
civil case, but such a "remedy" would be an even further circumvention of the 
criminal rules. In the converse situation in which the United States is a party to 
the civil action, the same circumvention of the rules results if criminal defendants 
are allowed discovery as to the United States in the civil case under the civil rules. 
Likewise, even when the United States is not a party, the criminal rules are under-
mined if the defendants can depose government personnel as witnesses. 
If the criminal rules were to be amended to allow broader discovery by both 
defense and prosecution, then civil discovery would not be in opposition to the re-
strictions of criminal discovery. Many commentators have supported the idea of a 
broader criminal discovery on the ground that such an expansion would transform 
the criminal trial from a sporting event into a quest for truth. See Brennan, The 
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When the criminal defendant has standing in the civil suit-
either as a party or a deponent-and the government is not a party 
to the suit, the criminal defendant can prevent the government 
from gaining knowledge of his criminal defense by obtaining a pro-
tective order from the civil court under rule 30(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.25 Such an order may restrict all but the 
parties and their attorneys from attending the deposition, may re-
quire the deposition to be sealed and subsequently opened only by 
the civil court, and may enjoin opposing parties and counsel from 
disclosing the information obtained.26 An arrangement of this type 
would allow civil discovery to proceed while the criminal action is 
still pending. This remedy is, of course, ineffective if the United 
States is a party to the civil action. Moreover, it is unavailable if the 
criminal defendant is neither a party nor a deponent in the civil 
action, even though he may stand to suffer from the revelations in the 
civil deposition of a person closely related to the criminal action. 
Indeed, even when the criminal defendant has standing to seek a 
protective order and the government is not a party to the civil case, 
it may be difficult to tell whether or not disclosure of information has 
occurred in disregard of the order.27 
The reported cases indicate that the usual remedy sought by 
criminal defendants in these situations is a stay of civil discovery 
pending termination of the criminal trial.28 In these civil cases, the 
courts have suggested that a stay was necessary to protect the defen-
dants' privilege to be free from self-incrimination even though the 
government was not a party.29 Whatever merit such a rationale may 
have in a case where the government is a party,30 there seems to be 
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279; 
Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964); 
Note, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases-Rule 16 and The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 315 (1966). 
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b) (1967). Such a protective order was requested in Simon. 
262 F. Supp. 64, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
26. Cf. United States v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary Corporation, 5 
TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) ,I 72,311 (3d Cir. 1967); D'Ippolito v. American 
Oil Co., 272 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y 1967). 
27. See text accompanying note 23 supra. 
28. E.g., Perry v. McGuire, 36 F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Paul Harrigan &: Sons v. 
Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1953); National Discount Corp. v. 
Holzbaugh, 13 F.R.D 236 (E.D. Mich. 1952). 
29. Perry v. McGuire, 36 F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), granted a stay of discovery 
to the defendants in a case in which the government was not a party to the civil 
action. See also Kaepple v. Jas. H. Matthews &: Co., 200 F. Supp. 229 (D.C. Pa. 1961); 
Paul Harrigan &: Sons v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1953); 
National Discount Corp. v. Holzbaugh, 13 F.R.D. 236 (E.D. Mich. 1952). But see 
D'Ippolito v. American Oil Co., 272 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
30. In ordinary civil cases, the privilege against self-incrimination is applicable 
but it may be invoked only as to individual questions, the answer to which the party 
believes would be incriminating. See United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 
273 U.S. 103 (1927): United States v. Matles, 247 F.2d 378, 383 (2d Cir. 1957) (concur-
ring opinion of Judge Lumbard); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2268 (3d ed. 1961). In a 
criminal action, on the other hand, the defendant has an absolute right to refuse to 
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little support for the proposition that a stay of discovery is required 
by the self-incrimination privilege, when, as in the principal cases, 
the government is not the party seeking discovery in the civil action.31 
A stay of civil discovery, by either the prosecution or a private 
party, can better be supported by the rationale which is often articu-
lated by civil courts in staying a criminal defendant's civil discovery 
of the United States: to allow discovery in the civil case would be 
"tantamount to allowing discovery under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in a criminal proceeding,"32 which a court is, of course, 
powerless to do. The converse situation, in which the government 
seeks discovery of the defendants, is surely no less an attempt to 
substitute civil for criminal procedure in a criminal case.33 Similar 
reasoning applies when civil discovery is sought against a person 
who is not a criminal defendant but is so closely related to the defen-
dants that he might disclose strategic elements of the criminal 
defense. Since, rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure34 
would prevent the prosecution from deposing all third parties, the 
prosecution should not be able to obtain the prejudicial information 
it desires through a civil deposition if the integrity of the criminal 
rules is to be protected. 
For several reasons, however, criminal defendants threatened by 
civil discovery should not have to rely solely on the civil court's 
granting a stay or protective order. As noted above, criminal defen-
dants may not have the standing necessary to obtain a stay or pro-
tective order in the civil case, 35 and protective orders, even when 
available, may not be entirely reliable. Moreover, the principal cases 
indicate that civil courts may adopt parochial attitudes about their 
take the witness stand at his trial. See id. § 2260. Furthermore, it could be argued that 
the right to refuse to submit to all questioning applies to the discovery stages of the 
criminal case, but see Jones v. Superior Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 
879 (1962), Thus when the government is a party to the civil action, perhaps pretrial 
discovery should not be permitted there as well if, as has been suggested, the purpose 
of the fifth amendment privilege is to prevent the prosecution from enlisting the aid 
of the defendant in developing a case against him. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 
(3d ed. 1961). 
31. Cf, 8 J. WIGMORE § 2268 (3d ed. 1961). Contra Paul Harrigan & Sons v. 
Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1953). 
32. Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 493 (1962) (Bell, J., concurring). See also 
United States v. $2,437.00 United States Currency, 36 F.R.D. 257 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); 
United States v. Steffes, 35 F.R.D. 24 (D. Mont. 1964); United States v. Maine Lobster-
men's Ass'n, 22 F.R.D. 199 (D. Maine 1958). But see Hiss v. Chambers, 8 F.R.D. 480 
(D. Md. 1948). 
33. In such cases, courts staying discovery have merely said that discovery would 
be oppressive or that the constitutional rights of the defendant would be impaired. 
See, e.g., Perry v. McGuire, 36 F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
34. See text of rule 15 quoted in note 14 supra. 
35. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. It also appears that the persons to 
be deposed have no standing to request a stay on behalf of the criminal defendants, 
Cf. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 271 F. Supp. 
689 (S.D. Fla. 1967), denying a requested stay by the plaintiff on behalf of the United 
States, the government not being a party to the action. 
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own actions and refuse to give relief despite effects on the criminal 
trial.36 Because of the irreparable nature of harmful disclosures, the 
criminal defendant should have remedies available to him when a 
motion for a stay or a protective order is denied or unavailable. 
One possible remedy for the denial of either a stay or a pro-
tective order in the civil court is immediate appeal. Under the final 
judgment rule, 37 however, it has been held that orders denying a 
temporary stay of discovery are not appealable since they are merely 
interlocutory orders.38 The only exception to this rule, other than 
the limited statutory procedure permitting a district judge to certify 
controlling questions of law to a court of appeals,39 is the collateral 
order doctrine. Under this doctrine an appeal, though interlocutory 
in nature, will be allowed from an order which is auxiliary to the 
main cause of action, which does not make a step toward final dis-
position of the merits of the case, and which would cause irreparable 
harm if review were postponed until after final judgment on the 
merits.40 This doctrine was apparently used in Overly v. United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,41 to permit an appeal from a trial 
court order directing a bank to produce correspondence from the 
Comptroller of Currency and to produce bank examiners' reports. 
The government had intervened and claimed that the reports were 
privileged and that their production would be injurious to the pub-
lic interest. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit viewed the 
order to produce as appealable since such an order would irrevocably 
destroy any value of the privilege claimed by the government and 
place it beyond the protection of an appellate court. Though the 
denials of the stays in the principal cases might have been appealable 
under the collateral order doctrine, 42 most courts, as in the Simon 
case, have denied the appeal.43 
36. A stay was denied in Simon. 
37. 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1964): 
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions 
of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for 
the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands, except when a direct review may be had in the Supreme 
Court. 
38. See Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1965); Brown v. 
St. Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15 (Supp. Ct. 1954); 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
'if 26.37, at 1711 (1966). 
39. 28 u.s.c. § 1292(b) (1964). 
40. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949}, See also 4 J. Mooiu:, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 'if 26.37, at 1719 (1966). 
41. 224 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1955). 
42. It could be argued, on the other hand, that injury to the defendant in this 
situation is not irreparable because a resulting criminal conviction could be reversed 
on the grounds of unfairness. A second criminal trial, however, would likewise be 
tainted by the prosecution's prior knowledge of the defense. To avoid such a stale• 
mate, civil discovery should be curtailed to prevent the prosecution from gaining 
such knowledge in the first instance. 
43. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
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Another remedy which may be available to the criminal defen-
dants is a ·writ of mandamus from the court of appeals ordering the 
district court judge to grant the defendants' request for a protective 
order or a stay of discovery. The court of appeals is authorized to 
grant a ·writ of mandamus by the "All Writs Act," which provides 
that "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Con-
gress may issue all ·writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles 
of law."44 This has been interpreted to mean that whenever a court 
of appeals can at some time review the proceedings of a lower court 
on appeal, it has the power in proper circumstances to issue ·writs 
of mandamus reaching such proceedings, even though no appeal 
has been perfected.45 At least one court has issued the ·writ to correct 
errors in a discovery order.46 Nevertheless, although there exists a 
broad power to grant the ·writ, this does not "authorize the indis-
criminate use of prerogative writs as a means of reviewing interlocu-
tory orders."47 Rather, the ·writ may usually issue only in "excep-
tional circumstances."48 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, in Schlagenhauf v. Holder,49 explained that exceptional cir-
cumstances permitting the use of the mandamus power would exist 
if the district court acted outside its power or "clearly abused [its] 
discretion as to make the equities of [the] case truly extraordinary, 
precluding adequate relief by way of appeal. ... "50 Still, it is pos-
sible that concurrent criminal proceedings might be considered to 
satisfy the exceptional circumstance requirement. 
A third remedy which may be available to criminal defendants 
is an injunction from the criminal court preventing further discov-
ery in the civil action. Indeed, this may be the criminal defendant's 
only remedy when he lacks standing to request a civil stay or pro-
tective order and, consequently, has no standing to seek appeal or 
mandamus.51 The injunction might be considered, under the "All 
44. 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1964). 
45. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). See also Rocke v. Evaporated 
Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1966); Com-
ment, Mandamus Pr.oceedings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Compromise With 
Finality, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 1036 (1964). 
46. Ex parte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435 (1915) (granting mandamus to correct a lower 
court action impeding production of documents essential to the petitioner's case in 
excess of jurisdiction). Contra, Byram Concretetanks, Inc. v. Meaney, 286 F.2d 170 
(lid Cir. 1961) (denying the writ which was requested to expand the possible subject 
matter of interrogatories that had been limited by the trial court); Fisher v. Dele-
hant, 250 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1957) (denying mandamus to compel discovery in bank-
ruptcy reorganization proceedings). 
47. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957). 
48. Id. at 256. 
49. 321 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1963). 
50. Id. at 48. See also Comment, supra note 45. 
51. This might occur if the defendant is neither a party nor a deponent in the 
civil case. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text. 
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Writs Act," to be a writ necessary or appropriate in aid of the crim-
inal court's jurisdiction52 in the sense that it aids the court's control 
over the evidence which it is allowed to consider. Some recent cases 
can be read to the effect that a ·writ is in aid of jurisdiction if it 
merely protects the effectiveness of the court's rulings.153 Thus, in-
junctions have been used by a bankruptcy court to prevent picketing 
which was hindering the court's ability to reorganize the picketed 
corporation effectively,54 and by a federal district court to prevent 
interference with the implementation of an order to desegregate 
schools.55 Though the injunctions issued in the Simon and American 
Radiator cases may not have been aimed at activity which would 
have denied effectiveness to the courts' final decisions, 56 they were 
aimed at activity designed to frustrate one of the major intermediate 
goals of any criminal trial court: fairness in all aspects of the liti-
gation. 
A stronger support for the criminal court's injunctive power in 
these situations is its supervisory power over its own standards of 
procedure. Relying on McNabb v. United States,57 the criminal 
courts in the principal cases argued that the injunctions were neces-
sary to preserve the standards of procedure and evidence required 
in a criminal case,58 and that the criminal court was under an obli-
gation to prevent encroachment upon those standards. 59 That the 
52. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. The "All Writs Act" was relied on 
in United States v. Simon, 262 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), reversed, 373 F.2d 649 
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 1030 (1967); United States v. American Radiator 
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 272 F. Supp. 699 (W.D. Pa. 1967), reversed, 5 TRADE 
REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) ,r 72,311 (3d Cir. 1967). See also In re Standard Gas & Elec. 
Co., 139 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 796 (1943); United States v. 
Western Pennsylvania Sand & Gravel Ass'n, 114 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1953). 
53. See Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909 
(1959); Dixie Highway Express, Inc. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Miss. 
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 36 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1967) (per curiam). 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that jurisdiction is not threatened unless 
the activity sought to be enjoined threatens to remove the basis of the litigation 
from the enjoining court's jurisdiction. See Note, Concurrent Civil and Criminal 
Proceedings, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1294 (1967). This appears, however, to be an 
unnecessarily restrictive reading of the cases. 
54. In re Quick Charge, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1947). 
55. Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1959). 
56. One could, however, make the argument that if the criminal court is denied 
the injunctive remedy, it would never be able to render a final judgment in the case. 
The only remedy available to the criminal court for the use of the prejudicial knowl-
edge-a new trial-would be ineffective because the prosecution's knowledge about 
strategic elements of the defense could not be erased, and therefore it is probable 
that a judgment could never be obtained. 
57. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
58. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Bohrod v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 
559 (W.D. Wis. 1965); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 213 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. 
Pa. 1962). 
59. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Ballard v. United States, 329 
U.S. 187 (1946); Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Wilson v. 
Schnettler, 275 F.2d 932 (7th Cir. 1960); Tooisgah v. United States, 137 F.2d 713 (10th 
Cir. 1943); United States v. Bonanno, 178 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
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criminal court has the power through the issuance of injunctions to 
insure that its procedural rules are not circumvented was established 
in Rea v. United States.60 In Rea, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that a district court should have prevented federal offi-
cials from violating the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by 
enjoining them from using evidence in a state court proceeding ob-
tained in violation of the federal rules, although such evidence was 
admissible in the state court. Basing its decision upon the McNabb 
supervisory power theory, the Court said that "[t]o enjoin the fed-
eral agent from testifying is merely to enforce the federal Rules 
against those owing obedience to them."61 Admittedly, Rea differs 
from the instant cases in that a direct violation of the rules occurred 
there, but certainly preservation of the integrity of the criminal rules 
is equally at issue in Simon and American Radiator.62 When civil 
discovery threatens the integrity of the criminal court's procedure, 
the criminal court's supervisory power would seem to support an 
injunction against participation in the discovery. 
Of the three possible remedial approaches when a stay is denied 
in the civil court, an injunction granted by the criminal court seems 
to be preferable, although it does have the disadvantage of effec-
tively overruling a prior determination of a court of equal juris-
diction.63 The criminal court should have greater familiarity with 
the issues in the criminal case and be more responsive to possible 
unfairness to the criminal defendants than would an appellate court 
reviewing the decision of the civil court on an appeal of a request 
for mandamus. And, since it is the criminal trial which is most 
60. 350 U.S. 214 (1956). See also Silver v. McCamey, 221 F.2d SW (D.C. Cir. 1955); 
United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965), where the dictum of the 
court stated that an injunction against civil discovery was proper when such discovery 
might disclose evidence which may be used against the defendant in a related criminal 
trial. 
61. 350 U.S. at 217. In a dissenting opinion Justice Harlan conceded that the court 
had the power to issue the injunction although he felt that it should not exercise 
the power in the instant case. Id. at 219. The complex issue in the case was the 
propriety of a federal court interfering with state proceedings, and in Cleary v. :Bolger, 
371 U.S. 392 (1963), the court refused to authorize such an injunction against state 
officials in a state proceeding. Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) expressly bars injunctions 
from federal to state courts except as authorized by Congress or where necessary in 
aid of jurisdiction. See generally Note, The Dombrowski Remedy-Federal Injunctions 
Against State Court Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS L. 
R.Ev. 92 (1966). Simon and American Radiator, on the other hand, involved interfer-
ences with concurrent federal proceedings and thus did not raise the federal-state 
complexities present in Rea and Cleary. 
62. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text. 
63. It is conceivable, though unlikely, that the civil court might respond to the 
criminal court's injunction with a counter injunction or an order to produce coupled 
with the dismissal sanctions of Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure._ Cf. 
James v. Grand Trunk W. Ry., 14 m. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958). Overly sensitive 
fears about the impropriety of inter-court injunctions are not warranted in the federal-
federal context. State-federal and state-state injunctions, on the other hand, present 
unusual difficulties regarding enforcement and comity because we are dealing with 
coordinate political authorities as well as coordinate courts. 
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severely affected by the unfairness of the civil discovery, the criminal 
court should be permitted to decide whether a stay is appropriate. 64 
But at the least, the potential detriment to a criminal defendant 
of discovery in a concurrent civil case requires the availability of 
some remedy from the civil court's denial of a stay. The most recent 
aspect of the American Radiator litigation illustrates the complexity 
of the remedial pattern.65 Following the Third Circuit's reversal of 
the injunction by the criminal court,66 the defendant requested a 
·writ of mandamus from the same court of appeals to review the 
original denial of the stay by the district court hearing the civil 
action, but the court refused the request. 67 The language of the 
court in its review of the criminal court in junction indicates that 
it believed that the defendant should have immediately sought ap-
peal or mandamus from the original ruling, rather than an injunc-
tion in the criminal court.68 However, on the later request for 
mandamus the same court summarily refused to undertake review, 
conceivably on the theory that mandamus was not an appropriate 
remedy.69 The refusal to review the civil court's denial on the merits 
is unjustifiable if the basis of the reversal of criminal court injunc-
tion was that a peremptory writ, and not resort to another coordinate 
tribunal, was the proper procedure.70 On the other hand, if the 
court in reviewing the criminal injunction was deciding the case 
64. As Simon and American Radiator illustrate, the court of appeals may eventually 
review the propriety of a criminal court's injunction staying civil discovery. The appel• 
late court, however, will normally reverse such an order only for an abuse of discretion, 
and thus the criminal court, admittedly in the best position to assess the possibility of 
prejudice to the criminal defendants, will generally find that its judgment is accorded 
substantial weight. 
The reversals in Simon and American Radiator are difficult to evaluate. If, as 
Simon suggests, that reversal was predicated on the appellate court's reassessment of 
the prejudice involved and a resulting determination that there had been an abuse 
of discretion, the decision is proper. In American Radiator, by contrast, the court 
indicated that another remedy was more appropriate-i.e., mandamus from the appel-
late court. The appellate court, however, is in a difficult position to determine preju-
dice in the abstract, and thus the criminal court would appear to be in the best posi-
tion to make that judgment. 
65. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Philadelphia Housing Au-
thority, (3d Cir. Jan. 1, 1968) (unreported), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3334 (U.S. 
Feb. 27, 1968) (No. 1069). 
66. United States v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary Corp., 5 TRADE REG. 
REP. (1967 Trade Cases) 1J 72311 (3d Cir. 1967). 
67. (3d Cir. Jan. 1, 1968) (unreported). 
68. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cases) ,r 72,311 (1967). Speaking through Justice 
Hastie, the Court said: 
The proper and orderly procedure, which the aggrieved corporations avoided in 
this case, is an appeal from the court which has first acted on the matter or an 
application to the reviewing court for a peremptory writ, not resort to another 
coordinate tribunal. 
Id. ,r 72,311, at 84,808. 
69. (3d Cir. Jan. 1, 1968) (unreported), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3334 (U.S 
Feb. 27, 1968) (No. 1069). 
70. See note 68 supra. 
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on the merits, it should not be required to hear what is essentially 
the same case twice.71 Indeed, the possibility of courts of appeals 
having to review essentially the same question twice can be pre-
cluded by making the criminal injunction the exclusive remedy 
when it is available. 72 
Whatever the balance of merits among the three remedies, it is 
clear that one of them is required. The Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were not designed to undermine the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, and the criminal defendant deserves a reasonable 
opportunity to prevent them from doing so. 
71. In another part of its opinion, the Third Circuit in setting aside the criminal 
injunction appeared to be judging the case on the merits: 
(W]e know of no rule or equitable principle that protects a defendant in a pend-
mg criminal prosecution from the disclosure, by another person in a separate 
civil action, of evidence which may later become part of the prosecution's case 
against him • • • • However, we recognize that widespread publication of such 
evidence in advance of the criminal trial might hamper the selection of an un-
biased jury and thus prejudice the criminal defendant • • • • 
The trial court has done no more than to reject blanket claims that proce-
durally the civil suits should remain at standstill and that no discovery whatever 
should be permitted until the criminal actions shall terminate. 
5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cases) 1/ 72,311, at 84,809 (1967). 
72. It is not altogether clear that an injunction will be available when the civil 
and criminal actions arise in separate states, a likelihood in the antitrust and secu• 
rity areas. Theoretically, the injunction will run against the plaintiff in the civil 
action and therefore the court cannot be enjoined in the absence of personal juris• 
diction over the individuals. ·whether the injunction is authorized in aid of the 
criminal courts jurisdiction, or under the court's inherent power over its own pro-
cedure, it is part of the criminal action. Thus the geographical limitations on service 
of process under FED. R. CIV. P. 4(£) would seem inapplicable. On the other hand, the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure extend nationwide process to the warrant and 
summons under rule 4(c)(2) and to the subpoena under rule 17(e)(l). A reasonable 
inference might be that the Supreme Court intended to vest all of the criminal 
court's acts with nationwide reach. 
